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Eligibility and Inscrutability
J. Robert G. Williams
University of Leeds
The philosophy of intentionality asks questions such as: in virtue of what 
does a sentence, picture, or mental state represent that the world is a cer-
tain way? The subquestion I focus upon here concerns the semantic prop-
erties of language: in virtue of what does a name such as ‘London’ refer 
to something or a predicate such as ‘is large’ apply to some object?
This essay examines one kind of answer to this “metasemantic”1 
question: interpretationism, instances of which have been proposed by 
Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and others. I characterize the “two-
step” form common to such approaches and briefl y say how two versions 
described by David Lewis fi t this pattern. Then I describe a fundamen-
tal challenge to this approach: a “permutation argument” that contends, 
by interpretationist lights, there can be no fact of the matter about lexical 
Variants of this article have been presented at talks in St. Andrews, Leeds, Barcelona, 
and at Cornell University. I learned much from the discussion on these occasions, 
especially from the excellent responses to the essay presented by Timothy Bays and 
John Hawthorne at the Philosophical Review workshop at Cornell. Particular thanks go 
to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Kit Fine, Daniel Isaacson, Stephen Leuenberger, 
Joseph Melia, Andy McGonigal, Brian McElwee, Daniel Nolan, Marcus Rossberg, Dan-
iel Rothschild, Crispin Wright, and two anonymous referees for Philosophical Review. The 
research on which this essay is based was carried out within the Arché AHRC research 
centre for the philosophy of logic, language, mathematics, and mind in St. Andrews, 
and I was supported by an AHRC doctoral research studentship.
1.  I follow Kaplan 1989 and Stalnaker 1999 in using “metasemantics” as a name for 
the inquiry into the nature of semantic facts. Other terminology for similar enterprises 
include “foundational semantics” and “theory of meaning.” Though the terminology is 
not perfect, I have no wish to introduce yet more nomenclature into this area.
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content (e.g., what individual words refer to). Such a thesis cannot be sus-
tained, so the argument threatens a reductio of interpretationism.
In the second part of the article, I will give what I take to be the 
best interpretationist response to the inscrutability paradox: David Lewis’s 
appeal to the differential “eligibility” of semantic theories. I contend that, 
given an independently plausible formulation of interpretationism, the 
eligibility response is an immediate consequence of Lewis’s general analy-
sis of the theoretical virtue of simplicity.
In the fi nal sections of the article, I examine the limitations of Lewis’s 
response. By focusing on an alternative argument for the inscrutability 
of reference, I am able to describe conditions under which the eligibil-
ity result will deliver the wrong results. In particular, if the world is com-
plex enough and our language suffi ciently simple, then reference may 
be determinately secured to the wrong things.
1. Metasemantics, Interpretationism, and Inscrutability
In Psychosemantics, Jerry Fodor (1987, 97) urges philosophers to give a 
broadly reductive account of the nature of intentional and semantic facts:
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue 
they’ve been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of 
things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps 
appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won’t; intentionality simply 
doesn’t go that deep. It’s hard to see, in the face of this consideration, 
how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to 
some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional 
are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with 
(or supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional 
nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else.
Fodor himself develops a positive reductive account of “aboutness,” 
attempting to describe without appeal to semantic notions a causal rela-
tion between words and objects that can be identifi ed as reference. With 
the semantic properties of basic lexical items fi xed in this way, one can 
derivatively account for the semantic properties of more complex expres-
sions, such as sentences.2 Like identity theories of mental properties, such 
2.  Field (1972) explicitly proposes this metasemantic account. Fodor’s own views 
are complicated by the fact that he takes the primary task of a causal theory of reference 
to be to give the semantic properties of the “language of thought” rather than natural 
language. Compare Field 1978.
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an “identity theory” of semantic properties has considerable prima facie 
appeal to the reductively minded philosopher.
The focus of our inquiry here is a range of theories that take seri-
ously Fodor’s challenge to provide a broadly reductive account of the 
semantic but suggest a different (though equally ambitious) shape for the 
account to take. Indeed, they reverse the order of explanation suggested 
by causal theorists of reference. Broadly, these “interpretationisms” adopt 
a two-step strategy. One begins with facts about the states of the world 
in which sentences are uttered. One then gives a recipe for extracting 
data in the form of a correlation of sentences with appropriate contents.3 
Secondly, one maintains that for an expression to have semantic property P 
is just for selected theories (those whose predictions match up with this 
data) to ascribe that property to the word.4 Overall, semantic facts—for 
example, that ‘Billy’ refers to the person X, or that ‘very’ is an intensifi er 
that operates on predicates in some characteristic way—emerge because 
they are part of a simple, fi nitary theory whose predictions mesh with 
facts about utterance conditions for sentences.5
On interpretationist accounts, there need be no “reference rela-
tion,” characterizable in nonsemantic terms, onto which our semantic 
3.  Sentential contents might be taken to be propositions (structured or unstruc-
tured), Davidsonian truth conditions, or even truth values. The choice will be determined 
by the particular interpretationism in view and the semantic framework targeted.
4.  It may seem that whereas causal theorists reduce the semantic properties of 
sentences to those of lexical items, interpretationisms reduce the semantic properties 
of lexical items to those of sentences. But this is not quite the right description of the 
situation. For (most extant) interpretationists, it is the usage properties of sentences (the 
famous “patterns of assent and dissent”) that have metaphysical priority. But then the 
semantic properties of all expressions are fi xed holistically by the selected meaning-fi xing 
theory. So there is no priority of semantic properties of sentences over words or vice versa 
for the interpretationist.
5.  Though we shall often talk about extensional semantic properties such as refer-
ence, the account is intended to generalize to a broad class of representational proper-
ties of language. For example, what possible-world intension a word is assigned will be 
fi xed in parallel fashion. My working assumption is that natural language will at most 
require the “double-indexed” intensions described in Lewis 1980.
Terminology in this area is notoriously contested (see ibid.). I shall use “content” 
as a neutral term to describe the semantic value of words within whatever framework is 
salient. So when discussing an extensional semantic theory, the content of a name will 
be its referent, whereas in the context of a double-indexed semantics, the content of a 
name will be (say) a function from context-world pairs to truth values. Relative to a dif-
ferent framework, the content of a sentence might be a structured proposition. I shall 
make no attempt to canvass all these options here; where the distinctive characteristics 
of the semantic framework being presupposed are important, this will be fl agged.
J .  R O B E R T  G .  W I L L I A M S
364  
vocabulary latches. Rather, we explain the constitution of semantic facts, 
such as ‘Londres’ referring to London, by appeal to holistic properties 
of a theory in which this claim fi gures—in particular, its success in gen-
erating sentential data on which we have an independent grip.6 The lack 
of reductive identifi cation, however, should not be thought to vitiate the 
reductive project. If we can pick out which holistic properties a correct 
semantic theory should have, in nonsemantic terms, we still have in pros-
pect an overall reductive explanation of semantic truths.7
Interpretationist theories sharing the two-step form are various 
in detail.
1.  They differ over how to express the correlation between 
sentences and states of the world, what the relata should be 
taken to be, and even whether the correlation should be 
taken to be a relation at all: contrast Davidson 1967’s use of 
“T-sentences” with Lewis 1983 [1975]’s pairing of sentences 
with propositions.
2.  They differ about which resources they will allow them-
selves in characterizing the data. Lewis explicitly appeals to 
a coarse-grained characterization of the content of proposi-
tional attitudes (expectation and preference) in character-
izing the pairing of sentences and propositions. This means 
that his metasemantic account will only constitute a partial 
answer to the challenge given above: it will afford a reduc-
tion of semantic facts to (coarse-grained) intentional facts.
3.  They differ as to what kind of semantic theory should be 
used to explain the data identifi ed: perhaps a possible-worlds 
semantic theory is favored (Lewis 1970a); or perhaps a David-
6.  This contrasts directly with one version of causal theories of reference, whereby 
the reference relation can be identifi ed with causal relations.
7.  There are philosophical accounts of meaning closely linked to interpretationisms, 
which do not look as if they can play this reductive role. There is a tradition that draws on 
Davidson’s work, which thinks of semantic properties by analogy to secondary properties. 
Just as facts about what color properties an object has are thought by many to be consti-
tuted in part by the judgments of well-placed observers, this tradition thinks of semantic 
properties as constituted in part by the judgments of well-placed interpreters.
The version of interpretationism I will be considering (following Lewis) emphasizes 
the interpretation (i.e., the meaning-fi xing semantic theory) rather than the interpreter. 
Unlike its rival, it makes no appeal to interpreters judging this or that, and it promises an 
account in nonsemantic terms of what factors make a given semantic theory the “selected” 
meaning-fi xing one.
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sonian truth-theoretic semantics would be adopted (see 
Davidson 1967; Larson and Segal 1995).
No matter what exact form they take, there are certain virtues shared by 
all interpretationist theories. It is a desideratum on metasemantic theo-
rizing that the fi nal account be (“to some extent or other”) reductive. 
This can be respected by interpretationism, but is not allowed to domi-
nate at the expense of other, equally well-founded desiderata.8 A good 
metasemantic theory should be universal: applicable to all words, rather 
than focusing on a range of special cases (perhaps names and basic 
predicates). Moreover, it should be nonrevisionary: just as we should look 
askance at philosophical theories about the nature of mathematics that 
cannot underpin standard arithmetic, we should look askance at philo-
sophical theories about what fi xes the semantics of language that cannot 
underpin best theory in empirical linguistics, whatever this is.9
Interpretationist approaches take universality and nonrevisionism 
as seriously as the reductive ambition. Universality is secured since all lexi-
cal content is treated in the same way: interpretationism gives conditions 
under which a complete semantic theory is true, and successful semantic 
theories will provide an account of the systematic contribution to the truth 
conditions of sentences made by prepositions, connectives, modifi ers of 
various kinds, as well as names and predicates. Since the accomplishments 
of empirical linguists in developing semantic theories for natural lan-
guages are the raw material for the metasemantic accounts of particular 
languages, nonrevisionism is part of the setup from the beginning.
In what follows we concentrate on two forms of interpretationism 
described by David Lewis.
1.1. Lewis on Interpretationism
Lewis’s overall reductive account of intentionality incorporates an inter-
pretationism about semantic properties.10 His fi rst step is to identify lin-
guistic conventions that govern utterances of sentences: these will provide 
the pairings of sentences with appropriate sentential contents (in this 
framework, coarse-grained propositions).
8.  As noted earlier, the reductive ambition is a major part of the Lewisian tradition 
of interpretationism that is our focus here.
9.  Compare the complaints in Williamson 2006.
10.  For the overall project see Lewis 1974, 1994b. For the specifi cally interpreta-
tionist component see Lewis 1969, 1983 [1975], 1992. For an introduction see Nolan 
2005, chaps. 6–7.
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A convention in Lewis’s sense is a certain kind of regularity in action. 
The basic data for Lewis’s interpretationism will be conventional regulari-
ties of only uttering S if one believes p (the “convention of truthfulness”).11 
The pairing of sentences with states of the world that interpretationism 
requires is provided for: S is paired with the proposition p if and only if 
there is a convention to only utter S if one believes that p.
Lewis 1983 [1975] exploits linguistic conventions to develop an 
interpretationist metasemantic account. Whether or not a semantic the-
ory (what he calls a “grammar”) is correct, relative to a given population, 
turns on which assignment of propositions to sentences (what he calls 
a “language”) is correct for that population. This in turn is fi xed by the 
linguistic conventions that prevail:
I would say that a grammar Γ is used by P  if and only if Γ is a best gram-
mar for a language Ł that is used by P in virtue of a convention in P of 
truthfulness and trust in Ł; and I would defi ne the meaning in P of a 
constituent or phrase . . . accordingly. (Lewis 1983 [1975], 177)
In Lewis’s account of what makes a “language” correct, characterized in 
terms of conventions, we fi nd the characteristic fi rst step of an interpre-
tationist metasemantics—identifi cation of sentential data. In his account 
of the correctness of a “grammar” (semantic theory), we fi nd the second 
component—lexical content-facts fi xed by the best theory of this data.
Lewis 1999b [1984] describes a different interpretationism—global 
descriptivism. The fi rst interpretationist step is to construct, for language 
as a whole, a “term-introducing” or “total” theory. Lewis is extremely 
unspecifi c about exactly what this “total theory” is.12 Global descriptivism 
11.  This is the formulation in Lewis 1969. In Lewis 1975 he complicates the account 
by adding “conventions of trust”: the conventional regularity of forming the belief that p in 
response to hearing someone utter S.
Further, more complex, approaches to specifying appropriate linguistic conventions 
are possible. Griceans, for example, might wish to adopt interpretationism about timeless 
meaning of linguistic items by means of conventions of individuals to speaker—mean 
p when uttering S (cf. Schiffer 1972). Avramides 1997 endorses this kind of proposal, 
combined with interpretationism, in addressing lacunae within the Gricean frame-
work. Not only does it extract a notion of the “timeless meaning” of sentences from the 
representational properties of sentence-tokens the Gricean has available, but it will 
underpin ascriptions of subsentential meaning, which otherwise have no obvious place 
in the Gricean framework.
12.  He is perhaps not himself endorsing the theory but rather offering it as a 
reconstruction of the view described as “standard” by Putnam 1980.
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therefore delimits a class of views, distinguished by the characterization 
of total theory they offer.
One version in particular is often associated with Lewis. This sees 
it as a generalization of the so-called Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis treatment 
of theoretical terms (Lewis 1970b). This treatment is restricted to the 
terms of some particular domain of inquiry: say, heat, or mentality, or 
inheritance of behavioral traits. In the case of mentality, the fi rst step 
might be to gather platitudes such as: “If someone hits you hard, and 
you are paying attention, you will feel pain”; and “If you are feeling pain, 
then unless distracted you will tend to wince and groan.” The introduc-
tion of theoretical terms is supposed to be accomplished by formulat-
ing such platitudes effi ciently and then transforming the resulting folk 
theory into a defi nition, say, of mental vocabulary, by the technique of 
“Ramsifi cation.”13 The associated version of global descriptivist metase-
mantics takes “total theory” to be “global folk theory,” the sum total of 
all the platitudes gathered from every walk of life—all the sentences that 
we take to be too obvious to question. In what follows, I shall assume this 
is the form of global descriptivism under discussion.
Next:
The intended interpretation will be the one, if such there be, that makes 
the term-introducing theory come out true. (Lewis 1999b [1984], 60)
Again we fi nd a two-step strategy. The fi rst interpretationist step is to 
identify an appropriate set of sentences—global folk theory. The second 
interpretationist step is to fi nd a semantic theory that renders all (or: 
enough) of these sentences true. (Equivalently, we could formulate the 
data as a pairing of sentences with truth values and require the semantics 
to match this.) If the language is suffi ciently simple, the semantic theory 
can just specify a fi rst-order model of the target sentences.14
13.  For an account of this, see Lewis (1970b).
14.  There are well-known worries about the adequacy of such models to handle 
some very simple languages, such as the language of fi rst-order set theory. The problem 
is that standardly models are taken to be certain set-theoretic constructions, and in par-
ticular, the domain of a given model has to be set sized. But since there is no set of all 
sets, there will be no model corresponding to the intended interpretation of set theory. 
One way of addressing this point would be to dispute the possibility of languages with 
absolutely unrestricted fi rst-order quantifi cation (Lewis 1970a). Another would be to give 
non-set-theoretic explications of interpretations and models of a language—we could 
instead use the resources of type theory, as suggested by Williamson (2003). Thanks to 
an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
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1.2. Paradoxical Inscrutability
An inscrutability argument seeks to demonstrate that one can account for 
the patterns in linguistic usage by means of radically deviant assignments 
of lexical content. If all that is needed for an assignment of reference to 
be correct is for it to generate the right truth conditions for sentences, 
then a successful inscrutability argument will show that there is no fact of the 
matter which object an ordinary name refers to. For example, according 
to the “permutation” argument popularized by Hilary Putnam, ‘London’ 
might as well pick out Sydney, Australia, as London, England. If the argu-
ment is sustained, reference would be “inscrutable”—there would be no 
fact of the matter whether the word ‘Londres’ refers to London, England, 
or to Sydney, Australia.15
As I present them, permutation arguments for the inscrutability 
of reference will depend essentially on interpretationism.16 More specifi -
cally, I discuss inscrutability arguments directed against global descrip-
tivism. Following the methodology of Lewis 1999b [1984], I will initially 
focus on a fi rst-order fragment of natural language.17
Recall once more that the core pattern of interpretationist metase-
mantic theories incorporates two elements. The semantic properties of 
a language are fi xed by assigning contents to sentences. Facts about lexi-
cal content are those given by an appropriate theory that fi ts this sen-
tential data.
15.  I would prefer to use the term ‘indeterminacy’ rather than ‘inscrutability’ to 
describe the theses argued for, to avoid any connotation that the theses at hand are 
epistemic in force. Unfortunately, terminology has split so that ‘indeterminacy of mean-
ing’ is standardly taken to refer to sentential meaning.
There are those who argue that all indeterminacy should be seen as an epistemic 
phenomenon (Williamson 1994). I do not wish to rule out this (surprising) contention: 
but nothing in the inscrutability arguments commits one to such a strong view.
16.  With many others (e.g., Lewis 1999b [1984]), I hold that moves intended to 
make the permutation arguments universally applicable (for example, to argue for 
radical inscrutability in the context of a causal theory of reference) are unsuccessful. 
For instructive discussion, see Field 1975. (This is not to say that other ways of arguing for 
[limited] inscrutability will not work: arguably Quine’s “argument from below” [Quine 
1960, chap. 2] poses a threat even given a causal theory of reference.)
17.  The arguments can be adapted to (a) more sophisticated semantic theories 
and (b) to different versions of interpretationism. On (a), an appendix to Putnam 1981 
sketches an extension of the permutation argument to modal languages. This is further 
developed in Hale and Wright 1997, including treatment of languages involving higher-
order resources. Elsewhere, I have worked through the details of adapting the permu-
tation argument to a (double-indexed) multiply intensional higher-order language of 
the kind described in Lewis 1970a, 1980. This work allows one to answer the objections 
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Assume the data provided by the interpretationist is given. We 
observe (a) there are many theories that match the sentential data; (b) 
we know that not all of them are correct. If the correctness of a theory 
just consists in accounting for sentential data, then it seems that we can-
not maintain (a) and (b). I here review a simple argument for (a), in 
informal terms.
Suppose we are working with a language whose only nonlogical 
vocabulary consists of names and predicates. What Putnam (1981) and 
others, such as Field (1975), Wallace (1977), and Davidson (1979) observe 
is that crazy assignments of reference to names can be “canceled out” by 
a compensating assignment of extensions to predicates, so that, overall, 
the truth value of sentences is unaffected.
Take a crazy assignment of reference, on which ‘Billy’ refers, not 
to Billy, but to the Taj Mahal, and, correspondingly ‘Taj Mahal’ refers to 
Billy. We show how to assign extensions to predicates so that every sen-
tence that was true on the standard interpretation will still be true.
In setting up our interpretation, we shall use the phrase ‘the 
image of x’ to pick out x  whenever x  is anything other than Billy or the 
Taj Mahal, to pick out Billy if x  is the Taj Mahal, and to pick out the Taj 
Mahal if x  is Billy. Thus, we can describe our crazy reference scheme 
as follows: N  crazy-refers to x  just in case N  standardly-refers to y and x  
is the image of y. Take any atomic predicate P. We adjust for the crazy 
assignment of reference in the following way: we let P crazy-apply to x  if 
and only if P standardly applies to some y, such that x  is the image of y.
Let the crazy-interpretation of our language be one where ref-
erence of names and the extensions of predicates coincide with crazy-
reference and crazy-application. What we note is that the twists cancel 
out—the distribution of truth values to sentences is the same on both 
interpretations. All this can be spelled out formally and extended to any 
“permuted” reference scheme we choose.18 What we fi nd is that, at the 
made in recent work by McGee (2005), who focuses on alleged diffi culties in applying 
the permutation arguments in the context of a language allowing quantifi cation into 
modal contexts. The issue revolves around the treatment of variables within the rich 
semantic theory: I discuss this in Williams 2005, chap. 5, appendix C.
On (b), some complex issues arise in adapting permutation arguments to a Tarskian 
truth-theoretic semantics or a semantic theory formulated in terms of structured proposi-
tions. I discuss these in Williams 2005, chap. 5, and Williams forthcoming a.
18.  Thus: let φ be a permutation of the domain of quantifi cation. Suppose N refers 
to a. Then let it crazy-refer to φ(a). Suppose P  refers to the function from objects to 
truth values f. Then let it crazy-refer to the function ƒ ° φ–1, which again takes objects 
to truth values. We note that
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level of sentences, all is as it was on the standard interpretation. This 
simple observation suffi ces to establish (a), above, if it is global descrip-
tivism, rather than one of the more sophisticated interpretationist pro-
posals, that is in view.
According to interpretationism, there is nothing more to semantic 
properties than being part of a theory adequate for a certain range of 
data that is characterized at the level of sentences. If generating the appro-
priate sentential data is all that is required, then the “standard” theory 
does no better than any one of the crazy theories. It appears that the 
interpretationist is committed to there being no fact of the matter about 
which of the theories is “correct” and, consequently, is committed to 
there being no fact of the matter about whether ‘Billy’ refers to Billy 
rather than the Taj Mahal.19
The argument for inscrutability just given attempts to establish 
(a): that there are many semantic theories adequate to the data that the 
interpretationist provides. But for this to constitute a reductio of inter-
pretationism, we would need, in addition, (b): that not all of them can 
be correct. That is, one needs to show why one should not simply endorse 
the conclusion of the radical inscrutability argument: as does Davidson 
(1977, 1979). This requires substantive argument, which it is beyond the 
scope of this article to develop.20 In what follows, I will assume such radi-
cal inscrutability theses are not only intuitively repugnant but also theo-
retically unacceptable.
•   PN is true (under the crazy interpretation) 
•   The function P crazy-refers to takes the crazy-reference of N  to the true; 
•   ƒ ° φ–1 maps φ(a) to the true; 
•   ƒ(φ–1 (φ (a))) = the true; 
•   ƒa = the true; 
•   the function P  refers to takes the reference of N  to the true; 
•   PN  is true (on the standard interpretation)
Such arguments show that atomic truth values are invariant under the permuted 
interpretations. A simple induction shows this to be the case for all sentences whatso-
ever. Hale and Wright 1997 gives details. A generalization to multiply intensional type 
theories is given in Williams 2005, chap. 5, appendix C, and in Williams forthcoming 
b, appendix.
19.  Of course, the interpretationist can fi x things so that sentences about reference 
such as “‘Billy’ refers to Billy” is true. But this is irrelevant to the philosophical claim 
being made.
20.  In Williams 2005, chaps. 6–7, I examine putative costs of accepting inscrutabil-
ity of reference. The most persuasive of these—concerned with damaging interactions 
between radical inscrutability and deductive inference—is further developed in Wil-
liams forthcoming b.
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Lewis grants (b). He is, however, committed to an interpretationist 
metasemantic theory. If the inscrutability arguments are not to engender 
paradox in his position, he must fi nd fault with the argument for (a). It 
is to his response that we now turn.
2. The Eligibility Response to Inscrutability
Lewis is committed both to interpretationism and to rejecting radical 
inscrutability of lexical content. So he must fi nd a fl aw in the inscruta-
bility argument just sketched. His favored response should be seen as 
composed of three moves. First, the correct semantic theory is the best 
one that accounts for the relevant data. Second, fi tting with the data is 
but one kind of theoretical virtue a theory can have; other virtues, such 
as simplicity, can make one theory better than another. Third, simplic-
ity is to be (at least partially) analyzed by appeal to objectively natural 
(“elite” or “sparse”) properties. Lewis is independently committed to each 
component, and we shall see that when put together, his response to the 
inscrutability puzzles—the “eligibility constraint”—follows.
We begin by setting out the second and third components, as they 
emerge in Lewis’s discussion of laws of nature.21
2.1. Additional Junk and Scientifi c Laws
Consider the ultimate theory T of microphysics, one which gives accurate 
predictions of the behavior of all subatomic particles. Contrast T with the 
theory T  ′, which is just like T except for the addition of a “redundant” 
natural law: one that generates no new predictions about particular mat-
ters of fact. Suppose, for example, that it governs the behavior of particles 
under nomologically impossible circumstances: what an atom would do 
if it traveled faster than light, for example. Since no actual particles meet 
the conditions (we will suppose), both the putative law and its negation 
are consistent with all the local matters of fact that the world supplies.
If there were basic facts about the world that did not concern local 
matters about the distribution of fundamental properties in space and 
time—if there were robust “law-making facts” of the kind that Armstrong 
21.  Lewis (1999a [1983]) himself notes the analogy between his treatment of laws 
of nature and his eligibility response to inscrutability arguments, but this is not pursued 
in much detail. Making the analogy exact would require discussion of Humeanism 
about special sciences and the standing of novel vocabulary within Humean accounts 
(cf. Lewis 1994a).
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(1983) postulates—then whether T or T  ′ is the correct theory of the world 
would be settled by correspondence to reality.
But some theorists do not wish to postulate law-making exotica. 
For these theorists, the truth-makers for scientifi c theories must be found 
in the arrangement of matters of particular fact, rather than in abstruse 
ontology. Call this view Humeanism.
As we have already indicated, T and T  ′ fi t the matters of particu-
lar fact exactly as well as one another. If what it is for a scientifi c theory to 
be true, given Humeanism, is just to fi t with matters of particular fact, 
then there is no distinguishing T and T  ′. Call this the argument from addi-
tional junk: it threatens to show that Humeanism about laws of nature 
will make it indeterminate whether or not the redundant law included 
in T  ′ holds.
The response of the Humeans is that there is more to being a 
good theory of some range of data than simply being consistent with that 
data. Fitting with the appropriate range of data is a virtue of a theory, but 
there are other considerations besides. Among the additional virtues, for 
example, are simplicity—how economical and parsimonious the theory 
is; and strength—how many claims the theory commits itself to and how 
much of the data it predicts. For Humeans such as Lewis (1986b, intro-
duction), the correct scientifi c theory of a range of data is the best theory 
of that data, where the best theory is one that has the optimal combina-
tion of simplicity, strength, and fi t.
With the generalized notion of “best theory” in place, we have a 
recipe for resolving the puzzle over T and T  ′. Since T  ′ is just T plus addi-
tional junk, it is less simple than T. Moreover, this loss of simplicity is not 
compensated by any gain in predicative power (strength) or descriptive 
adequacy (fi t). T  is the better theory, hence (if these are the only candi-
dates we are to consider) it is the correct theory. The threat of indeter-
minacy from “additional junk” vanishes.
2.2. Simplicity and Naturalness
But what makes for simplicity? Prima facie, the notion seems subjective 
since it is tempting to think of simplicity as a “projection” of facts about 
what strikes us as simple. One might reasonably think, however, that incor-
porating a subjective notion in a crucial role within an account of laws of 
nature is suspect: it threatens to undermine the objectivity of scientifi c 
laws. In response to this worry, Lewis (partially) analyzes the notion of 
theoretical simplicity in terms of objective features of the theory.
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The fi rst thing that strikes one about the “ junky” theory T  ′ is sim-
ply that it contains an extra axiom. That is, the axiomatized theory is syn-
tactically more complex. To address this, count an axiomatized theory 
as simpler than another if it has fewer, and syntactically less complex, 
axioms.22
This alone cannot resolve our puzzle. Consider, for example, the 
single property: being such that T  ′ holds. Let the predicate ‘P ’ denote this 
property. Now consider the theory T  ″, which consists of the single axiom, 
∃xP x. In syntactic terms, it is clearly simpler than T and arguably matches 
it for strength and fi t.23 But clearly we do not want it to be the best overall 
scientifi c theory, or the whole enterprise will be trivialized.
To address this concern, we start by distinguishing between rela-
tively natural properties: having spin 1/2, being green, being an animal, 
and so on; and relatively unnatural properties: being thought of by some-
body, being grue (being green prior to t, blue after t), being the mereo-
logical sum of the left half of a human and the right half of a donkey, 
being such that T  ′ is true. At the limit, we can distinguish the perfectly 
natural or fundamental properties from all the rest. (With Lewis, we shall 
continue to say that even the most unnatural such phrase denotes a prop-
erty: properties in this sense are “abundant.”)24
Lewis insists that, in evaluating a scientifi c theory for simplicity, 
the primitives of a scientifi c theory must pick out fundamental proper-
ties—the basic furniture of the world. Once this is done, we can fairly 
compare theories according to their syntactic complexity.
In order for this to contribute to an objective (partial) analysis of 
simplicity in terms of syntactic complexity, we need to postulate an objec-
tive distinction between the natural/nonnatural—between elite proper-
ties and abundant rubbish. There are good questions about the meta-
22.  For the moment, we set aside the question of how to measure the syntactic 
complexity of an axiomatized theory.
23.  See Lewis 1999a [1983]. The case is not decisive, however. For although the 
single axiom ∃xPx entails T  ′, it has little deductive power. The above point, therefore, 
requires that we characterize the “power” of a theory through its entailments rather than 
its logical consequences.
24.  On Lewis’s views, properties are sets of possibilia. More neutrally, I shall take 
abundant properties to be whatever entities play the role of semantic value of predicates, 
be this sets of actual individuals, sets of actual and nonactual individuals, functions 
from worlds to sets of individuals, or some other construction. In a context where we 
are committed to whatever ontology is required to underpin semantic theory, properties 
in this sense involve no new ontological commitments.
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physics of this distinction, discussion of which we will not go into here.25 
If the metaphysics stands up, we can cash out at least some of our claims 
about one theory’s being simpler than another in nonsubjectivist, non-
relativist terms. All else equal, one theory will be simpler than another 
if the fi rst is syntactically less complex than the second, when each is 
spelled out in primitive terms. In particular, then, we can make the case 
that T  ′ is less simple than T.
2.3. Naturalness and Eligibility
Now let us turn back to the case of semantic facts. The situation is anal-
ogous to the one we found in science. Various theories were available, 
all of which fi t the relevant range of basic facts, and an unacceptable 
indeterminacy threatens. It is attractive to respond just as we did in the 
case of scientifi c theories: to hold that fi t is but one among several theo-
retical virtues. To be the best theory of sentential data, a theory needs 
also to optimize the other theoretical virtues: in particular, simplicity. 
When offering accounts of the constitution of intentional facts, more 
than ever we must be wary of appealing to agents’ attitudes to theories 
in characterizing simplicity—for our ambition is a reductive account of 
the intentional.26
Now recall Lewis’s objectivistic (partial) analysis of the simplicity 
of a theory. Strictly, we look at how syntactically complex the theory is 
when spelled out in primitive terms, where “primitive terms” are required to 
25.  Armstrong (1978a, 1978b) provides a classic defense of the need for an objective 
distinction and advocacy of one particular form that such a distinction might take. Lewis 
(1999a [1983], 1986a, sec. 1.5) argues for the utility of the distinction and canvasses 
several forms that it might take without endorsing any particular account. Armstrong 
1989 is a more recent survey and evaluation of the options. Van Fraassen (1989) dis-
putes the entire framework of inegalitarianism concerning properties. Taylor (1993) 
argues for a theory-relative version of the distinction that will not secure the objectivity 
we need here.
26.  There is perhaps wriggle room here. If one adopts what Lewis (1994b) calls 
the “headfi rst” strategy to the intensional—giving fi rst a characterization of mental 
content in nonintensional terms and then allowing appeal to the mental content within 
a foundational account of linguistic content—then there is no immediate circularity 
in appealing to agents’ judgments of the simplicity of theories within a metasemantic 
theory. However (a) Lewis (1999b [1984]) wishes his metasemantic theory to be compat-
ible with non-headfi rst strategies, and (b) Lewis appeals to the same resources to deal 
with the threat of indeterminacy within his accounts of mental and of linguistic content. 
So both for Lewis himself, and for several other important versions of interpretationism, 
appealing to subjectively constituted constraints would induce direct circularity.
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pick out the basic notions of fundamental microphysics. We might for-
mulate a semantic theory by including axioms such as:
‘is an atom’ applies to something if and only if it is an atom.
But to evaluate the simplicity of a theory by Lewisian lights, we 
have to replace the term ‘atom’ as it is used by the theory (i.e., on the right-
hand side of the above biconditional) by a characterization of this prop-
erty in terms of the fundamental properties of physical science. This must 
be done, not only for scientifi c discourse, but also for the general run of 
natural language expressions: ‘is red’, ‘is a human’, ‘is running’, and so 
forth.27
Equivalently, we could assign a “degree of eligibility” to each seman-
tic value for a lexical item featuring in the semantic theory—a measure 
that refl ects the syntactic complexity of a clause that assigns that seman-
tic value to an expression. For example, the degree of eligibility of the 
property being human gives a measure of how much syntactic complexity 
is added to semantic theory by a clause assigning that property to the 
predicate ‘is human’. The overall eligibility of a theory is thus just another 
way of measuring the syntactic complexity of that theory when spelled out 
in primitive terms.28 Measuring simplicity of a theory by its syntactic com-
27.  We shall set aside doubts about whether fi nite defi nitions of macroscopic proper-
ties in microscopic terms are available (cf. Sider 1995). Also, we set aside worries based 
on the vagueness of natural language expressions in contrast with the precision of micro-
physical descriptions. I consider these and other objections in Williams 2005, chap. 8 
and argue that no decisive objection to the proposal results. I regard the “Pythagorean” 
argument to be described below as bringing sharp focus to the general concerns here: 
if we can resolve that puzzle, it is likely that in so doing we will be able to lay to rest the 
general worries just mentioned.
28.  I’m here supposing that the only aspect of variation between semantic theo-
ries will be in the clauses assigning semantic values to expressions. This works best in 
frameworks for semantic theory where almost all the work is done by the assignment 
of semantic values to expressions (e.g., the general semantics of Lewis 1970a). In such 
treatments, the only other part of semantic theory that potentially contributes to overall 
syntactic complexity is the compositional axiom.
In alternative settings, things vary somewhat. In traditional presentations of the 
semantics for a fi rst-order language, for example, the interpretation of quantifi ers is 
given through dedicated “syncategorematic” axioms. In Davidsonian truth theories, all 
clauses are syncategorematic.
In settings where the syncategorematic aspects of semantic theory vary among those 
in the running for being the “meaning-fi xing theory,” then rather than talking solely 
of the eligibility of semantic values, we need in addition to factor in the eligibility of the 
syncategorematic clauses—again, measuring how much syntactic complexity would be 
involved in writing these out in primitive terms.
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plexity when spelled out in primitive terms, or by overall eligibility of the 
semantic values assigned, are thus one and the same thing.
We can then restate the result as follows: a semantic theory will 
be simpler to the extent that it is overall more eligible.
What we have reached is exactly Lewis’s “eligibility” response to 
the inscrutability arguments.29 First, this response views interpretation-
ism as selecting the “best” (i.e., highest-scoring) theory, where eligibility 
is one of the factors relevant to gaining a high score:
We have no notion how to solve the problem of interpretation while 
regarding all properties as equally eligible to feature in content. For 
that would be to solve it without enough constraints. Only if we have an 
independent, objective distinction among properties, and we impose 
the presumption in favour of eligible content a priori as a constitutive 
constraint, does the problem of interpretation have any solution at 
all. . . . [C]ontenthood just consists in getting assigned by a high-scoring 
interpretation, so it’s inevitable that contents tend to have what it takes 
to make for high scores. . . . I’ve suggested that part of what it takes is 
naturalness of the properties involved. (Lewis 1999a [1983], 54–55)
Lewis focuses on the naturalness or eligibility of the properties assigned 
to predicates. The treatment above is a generalization of this, talking 
of the naturalness or eligibility of the semantic values assigned to any 
predicate.
Second, this response views eligibility as determined by the syntac-
tic complexity of defi nitions of a properties in perfectly natural terms:
Physics discovers which things and classes are the most elite of all; but oth-
ers are elite also, though to a lesser degree. The less elite are so because 
they are connected to the most elite by chains of defi nability. Long chains, 
by the time we reach the moderately elite classes of cats and pencils and 
puddles; but the chains required to reach the utterly ineligible would be 
far longer still. (Lewis 1999b [1984], 66)
Lewis’s idea that the eliteness (naturalness/eligibility) of a property is a 
matter of the length of defi nitions of those properties is exactly what we 
should expect if syntactic complexity of a theory T  is measured by the 
29.  Lewis states that he owes the idea to G. H. Merrill.
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“length” of a theory (say, the number of connectives it confi gures30) in 
primitive terms.31
(There are other passages, particularly in the paper, where a 
rather different account of the eligibility of theories may be thought 
to be in play. In particular, one might think that one’s account of the 
naturalness of properties should directly assign properties degrees of nat-
uralness that can be identifi ed with their eligibility. It is doubtful that 
this is Lewis’s view, and moreover it is open to independent objection. 
By contrast with the present interpretation, which sees Lewis’s eligibil-
ity response as a special case of a general analysis of simplicity, brutely 
imposing an eligibility constraint of this form on choice of semantic 
theory seems an ad hoc “monster-barring” move.)32
In terms of the arguments for inscrutability, the upshot is this: a 
semantic theory may fi t the relevant range of data about the content of 
sentences, and yet still not be the best theory of that data.
The kind of constructions required in order to generate the inscru-
tability paradox intuitively involve extremely unnatural properties. For in 
order to leave the semantic values of sentences invariant under a crazy 
reference scheme (e.g., one that assigns as reference to ‘Billy’ the φ-image 
of Billy), we need to assign a crazy extension as semantic value of the 
predicate ‘runs’ (e.g., saying that it applies to all x  such that φ(x ) runs—
that is, it applies to those things which are such that their φ-image runs). 
But typically this will be a much less eligible extension than the set of 
30.  Harold Hodes made the nice point that there may be ways of measuring syn-
tactic complexity of a theory other than by simply “counting the connectives” in the way 
alluded to above. For example, it is natural to reach for the resources of Komolgorov 
complexity theory at this point. Altering the details here should not change anything 
essential to the discussion, so long as “length of defi nitions” is understood throughout 
as a way of referring to the complexity of defi nitions.
31.  Notice that here we will need to restrict the range of connectives in terms of 
which we formulate the theory or else the account will be trivialized. It is in keeping 
with the general spirit of the eligibility response to postulate an objective demarcation 
of “elite” logical functions for this purpose: for example, there may be universals of 
conjunction and negation, but no universal corresponding to a complex twenty-fi ve-
adic truth function. For critical discussion of this way of handling “syntactic complex-
ity,” see Sider 1995.
32.  On the exegetical point: Lewis is offi cially neutral as to whether primitive natu-
ralness is to be preferred to primitive contrastive resemblance or a theory of universals. 
But only the fi rst of these accounts seems able to deliver “degrees of naturalness” directly. 
If the eligibility response was incompatible with a theory of universals or resemblance 
nominalism, it surely would have been noted by the author.
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runners.33 Interpretationists who claim that semantic facts are given by 
the best theory about the data can resist the arguments for radical inscru-
tability by arguing that the permuted interpretations will typically be less 
eligible than their “natural” rivals.
There are many areas in which more detail can be sought but 
which we have no space to pursue here. What are the metaphysics of these 
natural properties—is ‘natural’ to be taken as primitive, or can we defi ne 
it, as Lewis at one point suggests, in terms of a theory of sparse universals 
or tropes? Is the characterization of syntactic complexity offered above 
tenable and appropriate? Is it plausible that properties like ‘being human’ 
are less than infi nitely unnatural, in Lewis’s sense (i.e., are fi nitely defi n-
able from a range of perfectly natural microphysical properties)?34
Some further questions apply equally to Humeanism about scien-
tifi c laws as to interpretationism: Can we fi nd a way of “adding together” 
individual virtues like simplicity, strength, and fi t to get an overall virtue: 
the “goodness” of a theory?35 Even given a distinction between more or 
less natural properties, are we entitled to the assumption that there are 
perfectly natural properties?36
2.4. Dialectical Success and the Lack of a Safety Result
Let us, pro tem, grant Lewis all the resources he wants. In particular, 
let us accept both his constraint that, all else equal, a good semantic 
theory must ascribe to predicates extensions that are at least as natural 
as its rivals, and his characterization of the naturalness of properties in 
terms of the minimal syntactic complexity of a defi nition of that prop-
erty, in microphysical terms. Waive worries about the defi nability of the 
properties: suppose that every basic property (or property candidate) 
is capable of defi nition in a fi nite number of steps. Furthermore, grant 
that Lewis’s response covers not just empirical cases, but also mathemati-
I am convinced by the arguments formulated in Sider 1996 that the primitive natu-
ralness account faces severe objections (this can be avoided, it seems, only by the unat-
tractive option of committing oneself to sui generis abundant relations). So attempting 
to reformulate the eligibility response in terms of primitive degrees of naturalness is 
objectionable, as well as ad hoc.
33.  Recall that we were using ‘property’ (in the abundant sense) for the semantic 
values of predicates, so in the current context, we may speak of the eligibility of proper-
ties and extensions interchangeably.
34.  Sider (1995) raises this concern.
35.  See the introduction to Lewis 1986b.
36.  Armstrong (1978b, chap. 15) denies that we are so entitled.
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cal cases—the relation of addition, for example, is more natural than 
Kripke’s quaddition.37
I take it that, given these concessions, Lewis has given us an 
effective answer to the challenge from the specifi c permuted reference 
schemes that we have mentioned. The crazy-reference schemes above will 
lead to a less natural assignment of extensions to predicates such as ‘is 
a person’. Standardly, the entities falling under this predicate have the 
comparatively natural property of being a person; afterward, the entities 
are the φ-images of people, and this collection is likely to have no such 
unifying properties. The kinds of permutations we have considered are 
thus likely to lead to a less eligible overall semantic theory than the stan-
dard reference scheme.
The dialectical point generalizes. The point is that the inscru-
tabilist’s constructions are parasitic on the original semantic theory: 
obtained by carefully chosen modifi cations. In virtue of this, prima facie 
the inscrutabilist’s deviant semantic theory inherits all the complexity 
of the original theory, and then adds some more. Suppose we start from 
a “natural” interpretation of a language, which characterizes the exten-
sion of a primitive predicate P  by using the metalinguistic expression 
ƒ. Now consider the permutated interpretation based on φ. In the fi rst 
instance, we can characterize P’s new extension by using the metalin-
guistic compound φ–1 ° ƒ. Suppose that there is a minimal defi nition of ƒ 
in perfectly natural terms with n symbols. To escape the accusation that 
the permuted theory is less eligible than the original, the inscrutabilist 
will need to argue that (on average) there will be a characterization of 
the function φ–1 ° ƒ that has no more than n symbols. But the only char-
acterization we have available, in the general case, will use at least n + 1 
symbols. The general inscrutabilist argument thus fails to establish its 
intended conclusion, given the eligibility constraint.
Notice, though, that Lewis’s response does not provide any safety 
result. The Lewisian cannot rule out the possibility that there is some 
characterization of the permuted extensions that is as economical as 
any available for the standard interpretation. Since nothing in the Lewis 
account rules out this possibility, nothing in Lewis’s story gives a guar-
antee that every crazy permutation of the standard reference scheme 
will lead to a less eligible overall assignment of extensions to predicates. 
Might there not be some “symmetry” in the space of properties, so that 
when we map an object to its symmetrical twin, we fi nd a pattern of 
37.  Kripke 1982; for Lewis’s eligibility response, see Lewis 1999a [1983], 52–55.
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instantiation of relatively eligible properties that exactly matches the 
original situation? That the only characterizations that the inscrutabil-
ist has available will always be slightly more complex than the standard 
one is a good dialectical point, but it offers no guarantees against eligible 
unintended interpretations.
The lack of a safety result does not necessarily reinstitute a worry 
for the interpretationist. There are cases, indeed, where the gap is exploit-
able, and where arguably the permutation argument does go through. 
Two possible examples are, fi rst, mathematical theories containing cer-
tain “automorphic” symmetries: the complex numbers are a case in point; 
second, in empirical scenarios where there is some symmetry in the uni-
verse—for example, where the universe is periodic.38 However, even if 
these scenarios do generate inscrutability, it is not obvious that this would 
constitute an objection to Lewis’s program. Maybe we should be happy 
with localized indeterminacy in abstruse mathematical cases.39 Maybe 
we should not worry over contingent determinacy of interpretation, as one 
is confi dent that our universe is not symmetrical in one of these ways.40 
(For what it is worth, it seems to me that the eligibility constraint has the 
resources to rule out a great range of such interpretations.)41 But even if 
38.  For the fi rst case, see Brandom 1996. For the second, see Strawson 1959, chap. 1.
39.  This might extend beyond mathematics: Quine’s “argument from below” (Quine 
1950, chap. 2), and even the ordinary vagueness that affects almost all of our terms, 
might be thought to provide reasons for thinking that certain restricted inscrutability 
results hold.
40.  John Hawthorne has pressed these “restricted inscrutability” worries (in his 
comments on this essay for the Philosophical Review workshop). One of the examples he 
describes (the modal version of the “belief world” argument) differs from the indeter-
minacy induced by Strawsonian symmetries in threatening to generate damaging results 
for the semantic properties in the actual world.
41.  The key thoughts are, fi rst, that (at least as I have presented matters) the Lewis-
ian should measure the overall eligibility of semantic theory rather than simply the eligibility 
of the properties assigned to predicates. Consequently, the eligibility of the semantic val-
ues assigned to singular terms is as relevant as the semantic values assigned to predicates. 
Second, the Lewisian should insist that the semantic values of, say, indexical expressions 
such as ‘I’ are their Kaplanian characters rather than their Kaplanian contents: they are 
functions from contexts to objects. Third, the function from C to the image under symmetry 
S of whoever is speaking in C is parasitic on the function from C to whoever is speaking in C, in 
the sense that, prima facie, any specifi cation of the former will take just that little bit 
longer to write out in primitive terms than a specifi cation of the latter.
Putting these together, the semantic value of ‘I’ on the sensible interpretation will 
be more eligible in Lewis’s sense than the Strawsonian rival semantic value for ‘I’ (by 
2 and 3); ipso facto the sensible semantic theory will be overall more eligible than its 
Strawsonian semantic theory (by 1). Such considerations generalize to Hawthorne’s 
cases, I believe, but not to the Brandom mathematical case.
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arguments for restricted inscrutability of the kinds mentioned are either 
undamaging or avoidable, however, the point remains that nothing in 
Lewis’s story rules out there being some way of assigning extensions to 
predicates that will:
(A)  match, or exceed, the simplicity of the “standard” 
assignments;
(B)  fi t the data that is given by the fi rst part of the 
interpretationist story; and
(C)  are crazy.
The examples given above illustrate (A) and (B), but they may not be crazy 
enough to worry the Lewisian. But I will argue that we can state exactly 
conditions under which all of (A), (B), and (C) are met.
3. An Alternative Argument for Radical Inscrutability
We now turn to an alternative way of arguing for inscrutability that is not 
easily defl ected by the eligibility constraint. The result at the heart of the 
argument for radical inscrutability, due to Henkin (1949, 1950), is the fol-
lowing: if T is a syntactically consistent theory, then T has a model—that 
is, an interpretation under which every sentence is true.
Such a result is a promising resource for those interested in inde-
terminacy of interpretation, and they are discussed as such in Putnam 
1980. Consider, for example, the global descriptivist variety of interpreta-
tionism described earlier. Its demand on successful interpretation is that 
it render our “folk theory of the world” true—that is, that the interpreta-
tion be a model of this theory. So, if the folk theory itself is consistent, 
Henkin’s theorem guarantees that it will have a model.
These models need be nothing like the “intended” interpreta-
tion for discourse about medium-sized dry goods. Indeed, in the usual 
presentation of the result, the elements within the domain of the model 
are certain equivalence classes of expressions—clearly not the intended 
interpretation. There is, moreover, nothing to stop us setting up the 
model within the Henkin construction with any domain we choose, so 
long as the size is appropriate. So we could just as well build the model 
out of a domain of atoms, or of fi sh, or of abstract objects such as num-
bers.42 Thus, the models that Henkin’s constructions provide can be 
42.  Even if the domain of objects of the Henkin construction is that of the intended 
interpretation, we have a guarantee that the model construction by Henkin’s methods 
is not the intended interpretation if Tarski’s theorem on the undefi nability of truth 
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clearly “unintended,” but at least prior to the imposition of something 
like Lewis’s eligibility constraint, the global descriptivist has no resources 
to disqualify them. Each such construction is “as good as” every other, 
when it comes to fi tting with the total folk theory that constitutes the 
global descriptivist’s data.
It is not surprising that when radical inscrutability of reference is 
in view, more attention has been paid to the permutation arguments dis-
cussed earlier than on arguments for inscrutability based on the meta-
logical results just mentioned. The permutation arguments are an almost 
trivial result, model-theoretically speaking, whereas the model-existence 
theorems are comparatively diffi cult to prove.43 It is a mistake to ignore 
these alternative ways of arguing for inscrutability, however, for as we 
shall see, in the context of the Lewisian “eligibility” constraint, they form 
the basis for much more robust objections to interpretationisms than that 
resulting from permutation.
3.1. The Construction
I will now sketch how the Henkin model-existence theorem can be proven 
and describe how this can be turned into an argument for radical inscru-
tability of reference. The theorem is part of standard metalogic, so those 
prepared to accept the result on trust can safely skip this section and 
move on. I shall fi rst describe abstractly how the construction works and 
then illustrate the ideas with a toy example.
Recall that the challenge is to construct a model for an arbitrary 
consistent (fi rst-order) theory T. The Henkin procedure is as follows.
First of all, one modifi es the theory T  to obtain a consistent theory 
θ, which extends T  and has various other useful properties. In particu-
lar, it is “negation complete” (for any sentence S in the language of the 
holds for the targeted theory. For by a result of Bernays, the Henkin construction can 
be arithmetized, and we can extract a Δ 02 defi nition of truth in that model. Ex hypothesi, 
truth in the intended interpretation is undefi nable, so the constructed model cannot 
be the intended interpretation. Thanks here to the anonymous referee for pointing 
toward these results and to Daniel Isaacson for discussion.
43.  When radical inscrutability of reference is in question, permutation arguments 
might appear to do just as well as those based on more complicated methods—though 
this is disputed below. For other purposes, we might need to exploit the additional power 
of other argument forms. For Putnam, arguing that “ideal theory” will always be true, 
the permutation arguments will be of no help: the model-existence theorems are what 
is needed. Equally, for the arguments in favor of quantifi cational inscrutability given in 
Putnam 1981, the powerful, downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is required.
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theory, θ contains either S or its negation), and it is “fully witnessed” (for 
every existential formula ∃xφx it contains, it contains a “witnessing” for-
mula φc, for some constant c).
To obtain a fully witnessed theory, we might have to extend the 
language in which T was given by adding new constants (consider a case 
where T is formulated in a language with no constants: if T contains 
existential formulae, the need to extend the language in order to get θ 
is obvious).
Suppose we could fi nd a model M  for θ (i.e., a domain + interpre-
tation that makes every sentence of θ true). Since θ extends T, any model 
for the former is a model for the latter, so M is a model for T. Now, M 
provides an interpretation for a language that contains constants that 
didn’t appear in the original language in which T  was presented. But 
by restricting the interpretation to the original language, we obtain a 
“restricted” model for T  in the original language.
It suffi ces, therefore, to, fi rst, construct θ and, second, construct 
a model for this theory. To illustrate the general idea, let us consider a 
toy theory. Let us consider a “total theory” formulated in a constant-free 
language containing a single nonlogical predicate ‘Dog’. The theory will 
consist just of the pair of sentences:
∃x Dog x
∃x ¬Dog x
First, we introduce witnessing constants for the existentials, ‘Fido’ and 
‘Betsy’, say. The resulting extended theory is (the logical closure of):
∃x Dog x
Dog (Fido)
∃x ¬Dog x
¬Dog (Betsy)
Next, we extend the theory in a more-or-less arbitrary way to a theory T *, 
such that for every sentence φ in the language containing the two new 
constants, T*  contains either φ or ¬φ. (Obviously, we choose one that will 
not introduce any inconsistency.) If new existentials are introduced, the 
language may no longer be fully witnessed, so we would have to iterate 
the procedure. For simplicity, suppose we choose an extension where 
this doesn’t happen.44
44.  In the general case, we may have to iterate the procedure infi nitely many times. 
Effectively, we have two procedures: closing a theory and witnessing a theory. If we apply 
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By such means, we arrive at a theory θ that has the nice proper-
ties mentioned earlier: it extends our original theory T, and it is fully 
witnessed and negation complete. We then start to build a model for it. 
Again, I fi rst describe the abstract framework and then illustrate it with 
our toy example.
The general case takes all equivalence classes of constant symbols, 
under the relation “c = c ′ is a member of θ.” 45 The set of all such equiva-
lence classes will be the domain of the model we are constructing. The 
question then is simply how to assign elements of the domain to the 
constants, extensions to the predicates. The answer is simply to assign 
to each constant ‘c ’ the equivalence class of which it itself is a member, 
and to let an equivalence class γ be in the extension of a predicate ‘F  ’ if 
and only if for some c ∈ γ ‘Fc ’ is a member of θ. A few quick lines of proof 
then verifi es that this construction is well defi ned and does indeed ren-
der each sentence in θ true.
In the context of our toy example, the domain that we build con-
sists of two equivalence classes, ƒ = {‘Fido’} and b = {‘Betsy’}. We then let 
“Fido” refer to ƒ and “Betsy” refer to b. Extensions are assigned to predi-
cates in accordance with the description above. In this case, “Dog” will 
be assigned { ƒ }, since “Fido is a dog” is in the theory and “Betsy is a dog” 
is not. It is easy to see in this particular case we have constructed a model 
for our extended theory, and that, restricted to the original language, 
we have a domain and interpretation that make true:
∃x Dog x
∃x ¬Dog x
The above argument, generalized and formalized—a standard piece of 
metalogic—vindicates the bare model-existence theorem.46 Paying atten-
tion to the details of how this is proved, we can see that we can strengthen 
the stated result in a small way, since there is nothing mathematically 
signifi cant about the use of a linguistic ontology. We could use any set 
these one after the other infi nitely many times, the “summation” of all the resulting 
theories will turn out to be both fully witnessed and negation complete.
45.  That this is an equivalence relation is guaranteed by the fact that θ is negation 
complete and consistent. Given this, we can prove that θ is “deductively closed with 
respect to fi nite sets of formulae.” That is, if φ, ψ ⊢ χ, and φ, ψ ∈  θ, then χ in θ. (Proof: 
since θ is negation complete, either χ or ¬χ must be in θ. But if ¬χ were in θ, then {φ, ψ, ¬χ} 
would form an inconsistent subset of θ, contradicting consistency. So χ must be in θ.)
46.  Details can be found in the section on “compactness theorems” in Zilber 
2000.
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of objects C whose elements can be mapped in a 1–1 fashion onto the 
equivalence classes of terms described above. By paralleling Henkin’s 
construction, we can then build up a model for θ whose domain of quan-
tifi cation consists exactly of the members of C. In our toy example, we 
could start with {0, 1} rather than {ƒ, b }. Within the construction, we then 
put 0 wherever ƒ features above, and 1 wherever b is. Indeed, for any puta-
tive assignment of objects to constant symbols that doesn’t directly con-
tradict the identities featuring in θ, we can build a model that depicts 
that assignment as the reference scheme.
These latter modifi cations are trivial variants on the Henkin-
style construction: just picking isomorphic copies of the model that the 
Henkin procedure provides. One effect is to enable us to fi nd models 
embedding arbitrary reference schemes so that we can use the result 
within an argument for the inscrutability of reference.
3.2. Why It Pays Not to Be a Parasite
We judged Lewis’s response to the inscrutability arguments to be dialec-
tically effective against permutation inscrutability arguments. Our only 
grip on the complexity of the permuted interpretation is parasitic on an 
assumed “standard” interpretation. So the description of the new inter-
pretation will, in general, involve additional complexity.
The dialectical situation changes if we use arguments for radical 
inscrutability that do not have the parasitic character of the permutation 
arguments. The Henkin strategy sketched in this section builds “deviant” 
interpretations matching the interpretationist’s data independently of 
what the “standard interpretation” may be.47 Thus we have two interpre-
tations, one built up out of a domain of arbitrary elements, and we have 
no grip on how the syntactic complexities of the two compare.
This should itself disturb the interpretationist. For the inscruta-
bility argument at this point threatens to issue in stand-off—though the 
inscrutabilist has as yet no grounds for claiming his or her twisted theo-
ries match the intended theory on grounds of eligibility, neither does his 
or her opponent have any grounds for denying they do so. The stand-off 
is unhappy for the interpretationists, for their aim was to secure  scrutable 
reference, not leave the matter undecided.
47.  We can, for example, deploy it to build models of consistent but “ω-inconsistent” 
theories, such as arithmetic with the negation of the Gödel sentence adjoined, which 
arguably have no intended interpretation.
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In fact, on the global descriptivist version of interpretation-
ism, we can make the worry sharp. The fi nal section of this article will 
exploit this to make a case that, unless substantial metaphysical conces-
sions are granted, the eligibility constraint on interpretation will lead 
to absurd results when applied to the kind of Henkin constructions just 
described.
4. Pythagorean Worlds
Suppose we adopt a global descriptivist form of interpretationism. The 
data constraining semantic theory in this case is a “total theory” that the 
semantics must render true—or equivalently, a pairing of sentences with 
truth values that the semantics must match. “Total theory,” recall, was the 
sum total of all the platitudes gathered from every walk of life—all the 
sentences that are too obvious to question. If total theory is consistent, 
we know that we can fi nd models for that discourse since we have just seen 
how a standard metalogical result—the Henkin construction—gives us 
a recipe for constructing such models. For simplicity let us suppose that 
total theory can be formulated in fi rst-order terms.
We will be considering a case where this “total theory” is consis-
tent with there being only fi nitely many things. For example, the total 
theory will not commit itself to a plenitude of abstracta, or to infi nitely 
divisible regions of substantival space or time. (If one maintains that our 
folk theory of the world contains such commitments, consider a more 
cautious community who are at best agnostic about such matters.) Given 
this, we may consider a consistent theory that results from adding “there 
are exactly n  things” for an appropriate n, to total theory.
The Henkin construction gives us a model for this theory whose 
domain contains n  objects. As mentioned earlier, the Henkin construc-
tion is indifferent to the identities of the objects within the domain of 
the model: we can, for example, take them to be (an initial segment of) 
the natural numbers. Hence, a Henkin construction enables us to fi nd 
a model for the above theory whose domain consists of the numbers less 
than n. Call this the arithmetical model of total theory.48
48.  Timothy Bays, in discussion at the Philosophical Review workshop, highlighted 
what appears to be a tension in this presentation. The “total theory” of the world on 
which the interpretationist goes to work has to be fi nitely satisfi able, yet the model that 
the interpretationist constructs appeals to numbers (albeit fi nitely many of them). So 
prima facie the interpretationist appears to use a theory—arithmetic—which commits 
her to the existence of infi nitely many things.
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As anticipated above, we now have a situation where two inter-
pretations of our language—the intended one and the arithmetical 
one—are in competition to be the “reference-fi xing theory.” Again, as 
anticipated, the eligibility constraint has nothing directly to say about 
this situation. Unlike the deviant interpretations generated by permuta-
tions we considered earlier, our deviant interpretation is not specifi ed 
derivatively from the intended interpretation, so there is no quick prima 
facie argument for the intended interpretation beating the deviant one 
in point of eligibility. On the one hand, we can expect the extensions 
assigned to predicates on the arithmetical interpretation will in general 
not seem very “naturally unifi ed.” On the otherhand, the intended inter-
pretation will not typically assign to the predicates of natural language 
perfectly natural properties, by Lewis’s lights: the “lengths of defi nitions” 
required to get from the fundamental properties of microphysics to such 
macroscopic properties as being a table, being human, and being a stone are 
enormous (supposing such defi nitions to be possible at all).
But the situation does not remain a stand-off. In what follows, 
I shall argue for the existence of Pythagorean twins of the actual world: 
worlds that are similar to the actual world at macroscopic levels, but 
in which the arithmetical interpretation beats the “intended” interpre-
tation in point of eligibility.49 I then argue that the existence of such 
Pythagorean worlds leads to deep problems: ones suffi cient to reject the 
eligibility constraint if major alterations or concessions are not made.
I think this highlights dialectical  limitations in the argument as presented. One may 
not be able to use the arithmetical model to convince oneself  that one’s own language 
has an arithmetical model of the kind just sketched—absent subtle argument, either 
you reject arithmetic and thus arithmetical construction, or else your “total theory” 
commits you to too many things for the construction to be applicable. For exactly the 
same reason, the argument may not be able to persuade another that the arithmetic 
interpretation applies to their language. But it seems to me that when it is the language 
of a third person that is under consideration, we need not worry: you and I may agree that 
invoking arithmetic to construct models for the language of a third party is legitimate, 
even if that third party is at best agnostic about whether arithmetical models exist.
49.  See Quine 1964 for discussion of Pythagorean interpretations of language in 
the context of criteria for ontological reduction. Notice that I will not argue for worlds 
where the arithmetical interpretation is the most eligible interpretation, only that it beats 
the any “sensible” interpretation on this basis. Whatever the most eligible interpretation 
ends up being, in those worlds, it will be hugely unintended.
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4.1. The Henkin Construction as Giving a Benchmark
Let us look again at what the arithmetical model provides. It gives a way 
of interpreting folk theory, but more than this, any community with the 
same “global folk theory” as us are interpretable via the same arithmetical 
model, no matter how their world otherwise differs from ours. In particu-
lar, it seems clear that a world that has the same macroscopic structure 
as ours, or one that duplicates ours “from the quarks up,” will be a world 
where the relevant “global folk theory” is the same. The arithmetical 
model is a candidate for interpreting their language just as it is for ours. 
The effect of the Henkin construction, therefore, is to enable us to pro-
vide an interpretation whose fi t with total theory is quite independent of 
what might or might not be going on at extreme microscopic levels.
Now recall that we were considering a case where the total theory 
was compatible with there being only fi nitely many things, and conse-
quently the arithmetical model could be chosen so as to include only 
fi nitely many things (numbers) in its domain. The extension of each 
predicate in the language is fi nite, therefore, and could in principle 
be “brutely” specifi ed simply by enumerating the items in the domain 
falling under it. Since there are n objects in the domain, we can specify 
the extension of an arbitrary predicate under the arithmetical model 
in a clause with no more than n conjuncts. Repeating this for all the 
nonlogical vocabulary of the theory, we could in principle give in this 
way a fi nite overall specifi cation of the arithmetical interpretation. We 
can suppose that this long “brute” specifi cation of the model features m 
connectives.
On the Lewis account sketched earlier, we measure the eligibility 
of a theory by looking at how complex the interpretation would be when 
specifi ed in perfectly natural terms. That amounted to measuring how 
syntactically complex the theory would be when spelled out in perfectly 
natural terms. What we have just seen is that, in the case of the arithmeti-
cal model, we can fi nd an upper bound for this complexity: m.50
The Henkin construction and the intended interpretation are in 
a race for being the “best theory.” For the global descriptivist, they both 
meet the constraints of “fi t” and “predicative power,” since ex hypothesi 
both provide a model for the “folk theory” of the world. Which theory is 
50.  This supposes the mathematical vocabulary involved to be “perfectly natural.” 
This might be questioned, but so long as there is some fi nite specifi cation of mathemati-
cal vocabulary in perfectly natural terms, which does not vary from world to world, the 
overall point will not be affected.
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better comes down to which is simpler—under Lewis’s handling of this, 
we are to look to their relative eligibility. We have just seen that we can 
fi x the eligibility of the arithmetical model provided by the Henkin con-
struction (i.e., the minimal number of connectives in a specifi cation of 
the interpretation in fundamental terms) as m, say. Whether or not the 
intended interpretation “beats” the deviant one is then entirely a matter 
of whether or not the number of connectives in a minimal specifi cation of 
the intended interpretation in perfectly natural terms is fewer than m.
Now we are in a position to see the danger for the global descrip-
tivist. The Henkin construction sets a benchmark for eligibility that the 
intended interpretation must match. The threat is no longer inscruta-
bility but something worse: if the complexity of the intended interpreta-
tion is greater than the benchmark, then it will determinately be the case 
(on Lewis’s account) that the intended interpretation is not appropri-
ate to our language. At the extreme, if the arithmetical construction 
is optimal, we would secure relative determinacy of interpretation of our 
language—but our names for each other, for example, would determi-
nately refer to numbers.
4.2. The Existence of Pythagorean Worlds
One feature of Lewis’s picture of the world is that “perfectly natural” or 
“fundamental” properties are found only at the microphysical level—on 
this view fundamental properties correspond to the primitive notions 
of a completed microphysics.51 Expressed in terms of a theory of univer-
sals, Lewis’s view is that universals are ultra sparse—not to be found at 
any macroscopic level, or even at most of the microscopic ones. There 
are no universals holding of all and only humans, or of all and only 
instances of a particular chemical kind, for example (cf. Lewis 1986b). 
Exploiting this assumption, we can argue positively for the existence of 
Pythagorean worlds.
In our world, let us suppose, atomic nuclei are made out of pro-
tons and neutrons, which are in turn made out of quarks. Only this bot-
tom layer is a repository for universals, on the ultra-sparse conception. 
Presumably, that the microstructure of the world takes this shape is meta-
physically contingent. Consider therefore a possible world that replicates 
ours from the “quarks up” but that has quark-counterparts composed of 
51.  Presumably, though, fundamental relations in metaphysics will have to be 
allowed also: for example “constitution,” “part of,” and so forth.
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yet more basic particles, the subquarks. The ultra-sparse conception now 
places the universals below the quark-counterparts.
We can iterate this procedure, each time imagining underlying 
“layers” to reality. On the ultra-sparse conception of universals, such 
under layering pushes the domain of perfectly natural properties further 
and further away from the macroscopic. Moreover, each such iteration 
decreases the eligibility of properties, such as being human, since the long 
chains of defi nition formulated in perfectly natural terms now require 
extra clauses.52
One strange effect of the Lewis characterization of eligibility, 
thought of as a measure of the simplicity of a theory, is that a theory will 
become less simple as its subject matter becomes more complicated. Indeed, 
the process described above allows us to decrease the eligibility of all 
of the properties that feature in the “intended interpretation” without 
limit. For any number N, we can fi nd a world like ours from the “quarks 
up” with suffi cient microstructure that the syntactic complexity of the 
intended interpretation, presented in fundamental terms, is more than 
N. In particular, we can choose a world of suffi cient microstructure that 
the syntactic complexity of the “intended” interpretation exceeds the 
syntactic complexity m of the arithmetical interpretation. All the worlds 
we are discussing are like ours from the “quarks up,” so, as discussed 
above, the same “total theory” will feature in each. Hence, such worlds 
will be Pythagorean.
The argument for the existence of Pythagorean worlds relies on 
the Henkin construction, and we have here formulated that only for fi rst-
order languages. Such languages are relatively unexpressive, though: 
arguably, to interpret natural language, we would require higher-order 
52.  It is a nice question in metaphysics whether a world whose fundamental micro-
structure “goes further down” in this way can really still be composed of quarks. Suppos-
ing, for the sake of argument, that being a quark is a fundamental property of the actual 
world, supposing it to be instantiated by the quark-counterparts in the underlayered 
world would seem to require that the naturalness or fundamentality of being a quark could 
vary from world to world. But one might well be skeptical about whether the naturalness 
of a property can be a contingent matter in this way. However, nothing in what follows 
need wait on an answer to this question; we can assume for the sake of argument that 
the (nonspatiotemporal) properties instantiated in each world are alien to every other 
world in the series. Strictly speaking, then, perhaps we should say, not that the eligibil-
ity of the property being human decreases in the series of worlds described, but that the 
eligibility of the property that plays the human role decreases from world to world in 
the series. I continue to write in the loose way, for the sake of simplicity. I’m grateful to 
John Hawthorne for raising this issue in the Philosophical Review workshop.
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and multiply intensional resources. (Cf. Lewis 1970a, Cresswell 1973, 
Montague 1970, Partee 1996.)
On the other hand, the only feature of the Henkin construction 
that we required was the construction of a model for “total theory” T  that 
could be specifi ed by clauses of fi nite complexity, where the recipe for 
constructing the model for T  was independent of the contingent setup 
of the world.
To begin with, then, we can appeal to the Henkin constructions 
that are possible for simple type theories (Henkin 1950). The techniques 
involved are generalizations of those described here, and the effect is the 
same for our purposes. So the need for higher-order resources in describ-
ing natural languages does not alter our conclusion.
We do need to strengthen our assumptions slightly in order to 
handle the intensional cases. In order to deal with, for example, posi-
tive possibility claims ‘possibly p ’ featuring in total theory, our model 
will need to appeal to an extra “world” relative to which p  is true. The 
semantic value assigned to a predicate would then need to be a possible-
world intension rather than simply its extension at the actual world.
Our result will not be signifi cantly changed so long as we can still 
specify this intension in a fi nite way by enumeration. To secure this, 
however, we may need to place an additional constraint on total theory. 
In the original case, we require agnosticism over whether or not there 
are infi nitely many things; the analogous constraint is to require that 
total theory is agnostic whether or not there could have been more than 
N  things, for some N : only given this condition will we have fi nite exten-
sions for our predicates with respect to each world. Since all we are asking 
for is agnosticism on such points, I regard this as reasonable.53
The substantive point is that so long as we somehow obtain a fi nite 
specifi cation of a model in a way independent of how the world is set up at 
a microlevel, we will always be able to consider macroscopic duplicates of 
our world, where the “intended interpretation,” given in perfectly natural 
terms, requires a longer specifi cation.
53.  We also require that the theory have a model with only fi nitely many “indices” 
(for example, worlds).
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4.3. Three Problems Arising
I shall now suppose that the existence of Pythagorean twins of the actual 
world is established. We now weigh the costs.
The result is clearly disturbing: worlds that are indiscriminable 
from ours at macroscopic levels, but where our words refer to numbers 
rather than what we would standardly take to be their referents. I see at 
least three direct problems.
First, and most obviously, we have a violation of an extremely intui-
tive principle that (some) semantic facts supervene on the macroscopic 
structure of the world. Worlds that are structurally like ours, but have 
different microphysical constituents might well engender twin-earth-style 
differences in representational content, but there is no precedent for the 
kind of content change here envisaged.54 Here we have a people behav-
ing just as we do, within a world that is “well behaved” and just like ours 
in every detail from the quarks up; yet they refer to numbers where we 
refer to the objects around us. The suggestion beggars belief.
Second, the actual world may itself be Pythagorean. The complex-
ity of the arithmetical interpretation is enormous—but so are the lengths 
of defi nitions that would relate macroscopic structures to fundamental 
microphysics. I see no grounds for thinking that the fi rst of these large 
numbers turns out, in the actual case, to be greater than the second. 
Clearly this result would be a reductio of the interpretationist case: it is even 
more incredible than the inscrutabilist theses from which we started.
Third, even if the actual world turns out in fact to be non-
Pythagorean, its being Pythagorean is a nonskeptical epistemic pos-
sibility. One route to this conclusion is just by noting the observation 
made above: that we ourselves have no grounds for confi dence that 
the intended interpretation will beat the arithmetical interpretation. 
Another way of putting this: imagine a string of worlds, where each suc-
cessive world has an additional “layer” of microscopic substructure. By 
the above argument, at some point in this string, the distance between 
macroscopic properties and ultimate microphysical properties becomes 
54.  In particular, it is natural to take it that the A-intensions or linguistic meaning 
of linguistic items should supervene on macroscopic structure. But this would be vio-
lated by the present case. In the Pythagorean world, A-intensions as well as “horizontal 
content” (C -intensions) are abandoned in favor of extensions drawn from the natural 
numbers. The point here is that the whole semantic theory—including the functions from 
contexts to horizontal content—is to be determined by best fi t with appropriate data. 
In Pythagorean worlds, arithmetical extensions beat all such theories.
Thanks to Bob Stalnaker for pressing me on this point.
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great enough that the arithmetical interpretation beats the intended 
interpretation on grounds of eligibility. However, as things stand, we have 
no knowledge where this cut-off point comes; in our current epistemic 
state, it might be that a world that bottoms out at the level of quarks has 
a large enough gap between the macroscopic and the fundamental level 
to be Pythagorean.55
This last conclusion is extremely disturbing. Part of our reason for 
rejecting radical inscrutability in the fi rst place was to preserve epistemic 
access to semantic facts. We have just seen considerations that lead to 
the conclusion that, even if semantic facts do happen to obtain, we have 
no reason to think that they do, and consequently no knowledge of any 
such facts.
5. Conclusion
This article falls into three parts. In the fi rst, we outlined both the attrac-
tions of an interpretationist metasemantic theory and the ways that inscru-
tability puzzles create problems within this setting. In the second, we 
looked at Lewis’s eligibility response. As presented, this is no ad hoc 
paradox-barring maneuver, but a constraint on best interpretation moti-
vated directly from general ideas about how to give an objective analysis 
of the theoretical virtue of simplicity. The framework already in place in 
Lewis’s Humean account of laws of nature, when applied to the case of 
semantic theory, yields the eligibility response directly.
The eligibility response thus has much going for it: it is an inde-
pendently motivated way of blocking the paradoxes while remaining faith-
ful to the guiding interpretationist idea that semantic facts are fi xed by 
best theory of a suitable range of data characterized at the level of sen-
tences. Strategically, then, it is a sound line for the interpretationist to 
take. Moreover, it is a dialectically effective response to the most popular 
argument for radical inscrutability, one based on permutations of the 
intended interpretation.
55.  An alternative route to this conclusion would be to argue for the claim that we 
do not, and could not, ever know whether we have reached the fundamental level. If, 
for all we know, any one of the string of “underlayered” worlds described above could 
be actual, then the epistemic possibility of Pythagorean worlds is established. Schaffer 
(2003) argues that in our current state of knowledge we have no reason to think there 
even is a fundamental level. His arguments can be adapted to my purpose here, though I 
think the kind of world in which he  is primarily interested—a world of “infi nite descent” 
with no fundamental level at all—raises quite different issues.
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As we have seen, there are other ways to argue for radical inscru-
tability for which the eligibility response gives no such easy response. 
The model-existence theorems of Henkin (1949, 1950) allow us to argue 
for results just as disturbing as radical inscrutability, even granted con-
straints of eligibility. It is an epistemic possibility that the actual world is 
Pythagorean: that an interpretation that depicts our words as picking out 
integers matches the intended interpretation on grounds of fi tting with 
“total theory” and beats it on grounds of eligibility.
I have argued that Lewis’s global descriptivist is committed to 
Pythagorean worlds, and the resulting costs are unsustainable. But 
what resources has the interpretationist in general for avoiding the 
conclusion?
The fi rst response is simply to move to a different form of inter-
pretationism. I have not argued here that Lewis’s convention-based inter-
pretationism faces these problems. It is not altogether obvious that such 
a theorist can avoid analogous arguments for Pythagoreanism described 
above; but the issues are involved, and I will not examine them here.56
More directly, we can note the role played in the argument above 
by Lewis’s use of perfectly natural properties, which he assumes inhabit only 
the “fundamental level” of reality: in the framework of a theory of uni-
versals, this is the assumption that universals are “ultra sparse”—corre-
sponding only to the framework notions of a completed microphysics.57 
This assumption is crucial to the argument for Pythagorean worlds, for if 
there can be ontologically emergent universals at a relatively macrolevel, 
there is no longer an argument that “underlayering” reality will increase 
the logical distance between standard macroproperties and those that 
are perfectly natural or that correspond to universals.
56.  However, I argue that there is especial interest in the global descriptivist form 
of interpretationism. In particular, it is not committed to the “headfi rst” strategy that 
Lewis favors—Lewis’s convention-based approach makes essential appeal to contentual 
mental attitudes. The fl exibility of global descriptivism—not shared by its rivals—is 
especially evident when we begin to consider alternative ways of picking out the “total 
theory” on which it relies. One might, for example, regard total theory as the set of 
sentences of the language of thought that are (stably) in the belief box. Such resources 
are among those admitted by Fodor (1987) in framing the problem of intentionality for 
thought. If we had an adequate form of global descriptivism, then, it seems it could fi t 
into an (otherwise) broadly Fodorian theory of mind and language. It is hard to see how 
one could adapt other forms of interpretationism to provide a theory of the semantic 
properties of a language of thought.
57.  Together with, presumably, basic logical and metaphysical notions such as “part 
of,” “constituted by,” and so on.
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Thus we have a remedy, but it comes at a severe cost: what looks 
like an ontologically extravagant appeal to emergent property ontology or 
its analogue within other ways of explicating the divide between perfectly 
natural properties and the rest.58 The appeal would, of course, be less 
extravagant if one were independently committed to “macrolevel” univer-
sals or something equivalent—perhaps in order to secure an analysis of 
macroscopic similarity, causation, and laws.59 However, it is embarrassing, 
to say the least, that what looks to be a local problem for the metaphysics 
of meaning should require such substantial commitment.60
We can expect a familiar dialectic to ensue. If one wishes to pre-
serve the attractive package of interpretationist metasemantic theories 
and the eligibility response to inscrutability arguments, a prima facie 
case has been made for the need for a certain kind of additional ontol-
ogy. One now looks around for something that can do the same work, 
at a cheaper cost.
Recall the original need for perfectly natural properties: it was to 
avoid triviality results when explicating the “elegance” or “simplicity” of 
an axiomatized theory in terms of syntactic complexity. Appeal to per-
fectly natural properties puts limits on what predicates we could use in 
measuring the complexity of the theory. If we had some other objective 
way of distinguishing the “interesting,” relatively macroscopic properties 
from gerrymandered ones, we could have it play this role within Lewis’s 
account, and the need for perfectly natural properties at a macrolevel 
would be alleviated. I leave it to the ingenuity of others to think of ways of 
drawing this distinction without falling into circular appeal to intentional 
notions, or extravagant appeal to additional metaphysical resources.
58.  Lewis 1999a [1983] discusses several ways of making out a property “inegali-
tarianism.” On the side of property ontology, there are theories of sparse universals or 
sparse tropes; without additional ontology one could appeal to metaphysically primitive 
ideology: a primitive predicate ‘perfectly natural’ applied to properties, or a primitive 
contrastive resemblance relation between individuals. In each case, we can distinguish 
ultra-sparse versions of the view from versions that allow “perfectly natural” properties 
at a macrolevel. For example, on the resemblance nominalist version, we either allow or 
do not allow macroscopic objects to be related by the primitive resemblance relation.
59.  Schaffer (2004) argues for emergent universals on exactly this kind of basis.
60.  Moreover, there are knock-on effects of endorsing macroscopic, perfectly natu-
ral properties. For example, in the light of considerations adduced by Barnes (2005), 
it is hard to see how one could avoid metaphysical vagueness other than by restricting 
perfectly natural properties to the ultra-sparse level—and the coherence of metaphysi-
cal vagueness is hotly disputed.
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What is clear is that substantial reworking is needed if the line of 
response to inscrutability is to be saved. Unless we patch the eligibility 
response, Lewis’s remedy for inscrutability threatens to be worse than 
the disease.
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